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This thesis tracks the extensive evolutionary changes
which have occurred in the DOD/Navy Requirements Determina-
tion Process during the period from 1970 to 1974. A func-
tional model (which indicates the activities that should
occur) in combination with an organizational model (which in-
dicates the participants who should be involved) is used as
a prescriptive baseline against which the actual procedures
are analyzed and evaluated. Since most of the relevant pro-
cedures have been recently revised or replaced, the analysis
begins with a review of those in effect prior to 1973 in
order to illustrate several problems associated with them.
The nature and origin of these problems are subsequently ex-
amined in detail. Next, the many changes which have been
incorporated into the process are surveyed so that the cur-
rently existing procedures can be assessed in relation to
the prescriptive baseline. Finally, the conclusions drawn
from this evaluation are utilized as the basis for sugges-
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"The great technical complexity of modern-day
weapons, their lengthy period of development, their
tremendous combat power, and their enormous cost have
placed an extraordinary premium on sound choices of
major weapons systems..." [Ref. 15, p. 23].
These words from a 1965 article by C. J. Hitch have been
echoed repeatedly in recent years as the General Accounting
Office, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, and the Commission on
Government Procurement all concluded that one of the most
serious problems in the acquisition of major weapon systems
is a failure to adequately identify needs and goals before
embarking on new programs. Since most major acquisitions
are initiated to provide replacements for existing systems,
the specific requirements for them are too often assumed
valid without a thorough investigation of their projected
contribution to the overall force structure. Former Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Packard suggested that this tend-
ency to "think more in terms of what was effective in the
last war rather than . . . what might be needed for the future"
is a primary cause of development difficulties, and he con-
cluded that "no viable decision can be made on which weapons
should be developed without knowing in considerable detail
what kind of forces will be needed for the future" [Ref. 21,
pp. 2,3]. The GAO has further commented that "Our study of
the history of a fairly large sample of weapon systems leads
us to conclude that the function of deciding which weapons
11

will be developed is not yet being done with the degree of
effectiveness that this important function warrants" [Ref
.
7, p. 711.
B. PURPOSE AND APPROACH
This thesis is the second half of a two-part study de-
signed to ascertain an appropriate methodology for the deter-
mination of future requirements for major naval weapon systems,
The first volume of the study [Ref. 16] was concerned solely
with the problem of systematically identifying and analyzing
several different types of procedures which should be in-
cluded in the process. This volume, on the other hand, is
aimed at tracking the extensive evolutionary changes which
have been instituted in actual DOD/Navy requirements deter-
mination procedures during the 1973-74 time frame for the
purpose of assessing their effectiveness in correcting prior
difficulties.
A functional model (which indicates the activities that
should occur) in combination with an organizational model
(which indicates the participants who should be involved) is
used as a prescriptive baseline against which actual DOD and
Navy procedures are evaluated. Since most of relevant pro-
cedures have been recently revised or replaced, the discus-
sion commences with a review of those in effect prior to
1973 in order to illustrate several problems associated with
them. The nature and origin of these problems are subsequent-
ly examined in detail. Next, the many changes which have
been incorporated into the process are surveyed so that the
12

currently existing procedures can be assessed in relation to
the prescriptive baseline. Finally, the conclusions drawn
from this evaluation are utilized as the basis for recommen-
dations concerning further improvements to the process.
It should be emphasized that this thesis was not intended
to provide a purely theoretical analysis and evaluation of
DOD and Navy procedures. There are many practical problems
involved in military requirements determination which would
render such a treatment meaningless. The objective, there-
fore, was to conduct the analysis in a pragmatic manner that
recognized the functional and organizational constraints
which impact on these procedures and remained, insofar as
possible, within realistic boundaries.
Finally, the author wishes to apologize for any incon-
venience which a reader may experience due to the large num-
ber of acronyms used in the analysis. Since there are
repeated references to a wide variety of DOD offices and
documents with long titles, the use of at least some acronyms
was virtually mandatory. A complete list of those used is






This is a conceptual model which was developed by the
author in the first volume of this study to identify the
theoretical components of requirements determination and to
delineate a systematic methodology for dealing with them.
The model portrays the process as an iterative sequence of
five decision points involving the following functions: for-
mulation of military strategy; assessment of opposing forces;
analysis of perceived deficiencies; synthesis of alternative
solutions; and evaluation of solution concepts. Each of
these functional decision points utilizes the output of the
previous function as an input so that an orderly sequence of
operations is maintained. A flow chart of the model is de-
picted in figure 1 and serves as the basis for the following
discussion
.
The first function encountered in the model is FORMULA-
TION. This is the process of equating national security ob-
jectives with existing defense capabilities in order to
develop appropriate military strategies, where strategies
are defined as the means by which capabilities are utilized
to pursue objectives. Naturally, the projected global en-
vironment (including relevant physical, political and cul-
tural factors) is a vital consideration in this development.
The next function is ASSESSMENT. Its purpose is to eval-














































































Figure 1. Functional Model Flow Chart
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by potential enemies in order to determine if existing capa-
bilities are sufficient for the accomplishment of national
objectives. If so, an adequate force posture exists and
there are no requirements for additions or improvements. If
this is not the case, however, a hierarchy of deficiencies
is the resultant output.
The deficiencies thus delineated should then be subjected
to in-depth ANALYSIS. The objective here is to determine,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, what capabilities need
to be augmented in order to correct these deficiencies and
whether the necessary correction is best accomplished by
additional procurement of current systems or development and
deployment of advanced systems (i.e. a more or better deci-
sion). This determination is greatly influenced by the con-
straints of both time and money since new developments
generally require more planning and resources than do current
procurements. If additional forces are indicated, plans for
procuring them should be initiated.' If, on the other hand,
improvements are necessary, a delineation of the relevant
capability performance goals is appropriately the next step.
The fourth function involves the SYNTHESIS of alterna-
tive system concepts in response to the needs and goals de-
rived from the foregoing analysis. The driving forces in
this process are existing research and development opportun-
ities, where research connotes what is thought to be feasible
while development refers to what is known to bo feasible.
The nature of such opportunities is, of course, influenced
by the same time and money constraints mentioned previously.
16

The final function in the model is EVALUATION. This
function involves the consideration and comparison of the
synthesized concepts in light of three important criteria:
operational practicality, technical feasibility, and economic
affordability
. If none of the concepts is acceptable, the
process becomes iterative and new concepts must be synthe-
sized until one or more is accepted. When that occurs, the
validated concepts can be expressed as requirements for ad-
vanced systems development and the cycle, but not the process,
is complete.
In order for this process to reach true completion, an
adequate force posture must be achieved. Therefore, the en-
tire procedure is implicitly iterative in that the procure-
ment or development requirements evolved in each cycle must
be fed back as an adjustment to existing capabilities. If
the subsequent formulation and assessment indicate that an
adequate force posture has been achieved, the additions or
imporvements generated by the previous iteration are suffi-
cient. If not, the process must continue to generate further
requirements until such is the case.
It should be noted that this conceptual model is inten-
tionally extremely simplified and generalized. It was de-
signed solely as a prescriptive procedural outline, not as
the exact representation of an operational process. Although
it may not be possible for a "real-world" process to be this
definitized, the author contends that each of the elements





This model, also prescriptive in nature, was developed
by the Commission on Government Procurement to delineate the
relationships which should exist among Congress, OSD, the
services, and industry as participants in the acquisition of
major weapon systems [Ref. 6, Part C]. The summary chart
depicted in figure 2 illustrates these relationships and
forms the backdrop for the following discussion of the model.
The Commission viewed the individual services as the ap-
propriate initiators of the systems acquisition process
through identification and submission of projected deficien-
cies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The
correct role of OSD then is to reconcile these specific de-
ficiencies with overall Defense goals and determine appro-
priate resource constraints. Congress should have the
function of conducting a general overview of mission capa-
bilities and deficiencies.
Once needs and goals have been established by OSD and
reviewed by Congress, it is the services' responsibility to
solicit proposals from industry for satisfying them and to
sponsor the preferred candidate solutions. These should be
subsequently reviewed by OSD and submitted to Congress for
exploration authorization.
The authorized exploration can then be conducted by in-
dustry; with the most promising and desirable system concepts
to be evaluated by the services in order to determine which
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evaluation should be reviewed and validated by OSD and the
chosen system submitted to Congress for development appro-
priation.
It is readily apparent from figure 2 and the foregoing
discussion that the divisions of the organizational model
(i.e. establishing needs and goals, exploring alternative
systems, and choosing preferred system) correspond quite
closely with the functional model activities of analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation. It is necessary, therefore, to
augment the "front end" of the organizational model with ap-
propriate counterparts for the functions of formulation and
assessment in order to complete the prescriptive baseline.
The basis for this augmentation is provided by Title 10 of
the United States Code and the National Security Act of 1947.
The National Security Council (NSC) is legally charged
with the responsibility "to assess and appraise the objec-
tives, commitments, and risks of the United States in rela-
tion to our actual and potential military power, in the
interest of national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection therewith"
[Title 10, U.S. Code]. The DOD input to this task is pro-
vided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) through the Secre-
tary of Defense (SECDEF). The individual services, in turn,
provide supplemental inputs concerning their own areas of
designated mission responsibility. The activities of formu-
lation and assessment in the functional model, therefore,
may be viewed as being initiated by the services and the JCS,
20

subject to SECDEF guidance, NSC validation, and Presidential
approval
.
The "augmented" organizational model, in conjunction
with the functional model, comprises the prescriptive base-
line against which the DOD requirements determination pro-
cedures discussed in subsequent chapters are evaluated.
Figure 3 summarizes the various functional/organizational
interfaces involved in this baseline in order to facilitate
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III. REVIEW OF PRE- 1973 PROCEDURES 1
The DOD requirements determination process has often been
described as the bridge between the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS) and the R&D planning system. As
such, it is composed of a complicated and somewhat confusing
combination of procedures and documents from both systems.
As noted in the introduction, many of these have been revised
or replaced in the past two years. In order to develop the
rationale for the extensive changes which have occurred, it
is necessary to review the procedures and documents which
preceeded them. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is
to delineate the process as it existed during the period
prior to 1973.
In order to facilitate comparison with the prescriptive
baseline, the discussion of the process has been broken down
into the five functional categories described in the last
chapter. While the chosen breakpoints may appear somewhat
arbitrary, the author feels they are defensible on the
grounds that they are intended solely as pedagogical aids.
Before proceeding with the review, two caveats are in
order. First, although the discussion is conducted in the
present tense, all references in this chapter are to pre-1973
For the sake of simplicity, this review is primarily
concerned with the formally documented procedures delineated
in the Navy Programming Manual [Ref. 26] and the Navy RDT&E
Management Guide [Ref. 1].

procedures. Second, since there has been a tremendous amount
of variation in the evolution of individual requirements,
the discussion covers what was generally supposed to occur
rather than what actually happened in any specific case.
A. FORMULATION OF STRATEGY
As noted in the previous chapter, the legal responsibil-
ity for development of national security policy is vested in
the NSC. Its findings and opinions are published in the form
of National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM) which, when
approved by the President, provide the basis for National
Security Decision Memorandums (NSDM). These memorandums, in
conjunction with intelligence estimates provided by the De-
fense Intelligency Agency (DIA), are used by the JCS as
source documents in their formulation of military strategy.
The formulation process itself is accomplished within the
framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). In
particular, Volume One of the Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan (JSOP I) provides appropriate military strategy for the
short and mid-range period (up to ten years in the future)
in accordance with the national security objectives deline-
ated by NSC plus environmental estimates contained in the
Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). This lat-
ter document describes various situations and developments
that might affect U.S. defense capabilities and enumerates




The long range period (10-20 years) is covered by the
Joint Long Range Strategic Study (JLRSS) which addresses the
strategic implications of projected world-wide economic,
political, social, and technical trends. Its primary envi-
ronmental input is the recently instituted Joint Long Range
Estimative Intelligence Document (JLREID) which summarizes
factors and trends affecting world power relationships in
the long-range period.
The specific implications for naval forces contained in
both the JSOP and JLRSS are developed and amplified by the
Navy Strategic Study (NSS) which covers the entire twenty-
year range and summarizes current Navy roles and tasks as
well as concepts for future Navy contributions to national
defense.
B. ASSESSMENT OF FORCES
This function is performed concurrently by the JCS (in
the development of JSOP, Volume Two) and the individual serv-
ices. Its principal inputs are the strategy documents just
described, the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG),
and detailed intelligence projections prepared by DIA. The
most noteworthy of the latter is the Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning (DIPP) which contains military force
projections for the Soviet Union (USSR) and the Peoples Re-
public of China (PRC).
While JCS assessments are primarily concerned with over-
all 'U.S. force requirements for coping with global military
threats, assessment in the Navy is more oriented toward the
25

adequacy and effectiveness of specific capabilities. Nor-
mally performed by individual mission sponsors in accordance
with the CNO Planning and Programming Guidance (CPPG) , Navy
assessments typically investigate the probability that, at
some point in the future, a potential enemy will possess a
particular capability of such size and/or sophistication
that the relevant Navy capability will be too small, too old,
or too primitive for successful engagement. When that prob-
ability is considered significant, a prospective deficiency
is identified and analyzed in the sponsor's force planning
documents (e.g. The Naval Aviation Plan) and the CNO Program
Analysis Memoranda (CPAM).
C. ANALYSIS OF DEFICIENCIES (
Once a prospective deficiency has been identified, the
sponsor generally determines that it will require correction
by accelerated procurement of current systems, modernization
of older systems, or development of advanced systems -- de-
pending on whether the deficiency is perceived to be the re-
sult of numbers, age, or obsolescence. Those deficiencies
that are expected to involve extensive research and develop-
ment (R&D) efforts are then delineated in statements of Gen-
eral Operational Requirements (GOR) which project the
performance capability parameters which will be needed.
The R&D needs of all the services are monitored by the
JCS through the Joint Research and Development Objectives
Document (JRDOD). Its purpose is to translate the JLRSS and
JSOP implications for future capability needs into specific
26

R&D objectives as an aid to SECDEF in the proper orientation
of the overall Defense R&D program. The Director of Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E) is concurrently involved in
this effort through production of Area Coordinating Papers
(ACP) and Mission Area Summaries (MAS). These documents are
designed to provide SECDEF with a broad overview of each
mission area by identifying existing or projected problems,
describing current programs for dealing with them, and pre-
dicting the net impact of these programs on the future force
structure.
D. SYNTHESIS OF ALTERNATIVES
The Naval Material Command (NAVMAT), the technical repre-
sentative in the Navy requirements definition dialogue, de-
velops Navy Technological Projections (NTP) as its initial
response to GOR-specif ied deficiencies. This document sup-
plies the mission sponsors in OPNAV with an outline of new
or improved capabilities believed to be reasonably attainable
in the foreseeable future. In a parallel role at the OSD
level, DDR&E produces Technology Coordinating Papers (TCP)
to provide the same type of information for SECDEF. These
two documents are designed as tools in the process of refin-
ing broad need projections into more concrete development
objectives.
Once a need has been fairly clearly defined by the mis-
sion sponsor, a Tenative Specific Operational Requirement
(TSOtt) is established and documented. It is the first step
in the conception of a specific system requirement and serves
27

as a formal request from OPNAV to NAVMAT for the information
necessary to define the scope of effort and resources re-
quired to achieve the particular capability it describes.
It does not establish a firm requirement nor authorize com-
mencement of a development program. It is designed merely
to delineate a specific need, identify the operational capa-
bilities necessary to satisfy the need, and request an in-
vestigation into the feasibility of providing those
capabilities
.
After a thorough examination of the relevant technologi-
cal opportunities that are available, NAVMAT responds to the
TSOR with Proposed Technical Approaches (PTA). These are
documented by the appropriate systems commands as an outline
of the various alternative means by which the required capa-
bilities may be feasibly attained, including estimates of
the costs and risks associated with each one. It is then
the responsibility of the mission sponsor to determine if
one or more of the concepts delineated in the PTA are ade-
quate to fulfill the operational need.
E. EVALUATION OF CONCEPTS
Upon receipt of the PTA by the mission sponsor, a long
and multi-level evaluation process is initiated. The first
step is for the sponsor to decide if the PTA offers clearly
useful concepts which can be developed under acceptable lev-
els of technical and financial risk. If such is the case, a
Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) can be established in
order to formally state the need for a particular capability
28

and outline the system characteristics by which this capa-
bility is to be achieved. If it is not the case, however,
the sponsor's response is an Advanced Development Objective
(ADO) which delineates the need for experimental development
of concepts which do not yet exhibit acceptable risk in the
areas of military usefulness, technical feasibility, or eco-
nomic acceptability. In either event, NAVMAT replies with a
Technical Development Plan (TDP) which documents the specific
actions, procedures, and resources necessary to achieve the
required capability. This represents the final portion of
the OPNAV-NAVMAT requirements definition dialogue and forms
the information base for higher-level evaluation.
When a TDP has been submitted by NAVMAT and accepted by
OPNAV, the mission sponsor (in coordination with the NAVMAT
program manager) begins preparation of a Development Concept
Paper (DCP). This document is designed as a coordinated
management tool which provides the basis for SECDEF deci-
sions on a major development program and serves as the in-
strument for decision implementation. As such, it is
basically a contract between SECDEF and the cognizant serv-
ice which governs the administration of the program.
When a draft DCP has been prepared for a particular de-
velopment, it is submitted initially to the Chief of Naval
Operations Executive Board (CEB) for a review of Navy issues
and alternatives. Their recommendations, as validated by
the CNO, are then incorporated by the sponsor into the DCP.
The revised draft is next submitted to DDR&E for review and
29

comment prior to presentation to the Defense System Acquisi-
tion Review Council (DSARC). When the final draft has been
t
agreed upon, it is presented by the sponsor at various lev-
els within OPNAV and finally to the DSARC itself.
The purpose of the first DSARC review (DSARC I) is to
ensure (from an OSD standpoint) that a valid need has been
identified, that all viable alternatives for fulfilling it
have been examined, and that the proposed system parameters
are realistic in terms of risk and cost. When the DCP has
been approved by the DSARC and signed by SECDEF, the system
development is included as an element of the Five Year De-
fense Program (FYDP). Finally, during the congressional bud-
get hearings, it is supported for funding by SECDEF, DDR&E,
and CNO as well as other cognizant Navy officials.
The documents and relationships just described are illus-
trated in figure 4 in order to facilitate comparison with
the prescriptive baseline summary depicted in figure 3 even
though the organizational divisions of the two figures dif-
fer, the reader may note that they appear to be highly cor-
related. The objective of the next chapter is to demonstrate
that, due to a number of problems involved with the pre-1973
procedures, their similarity to the prescriptive baseline is
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IV. EXAMINATION OF MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS 2
It has been noted by various different authorities that
most major system requirements are generated to provide re-
placements for existing systems without a sufficiently thor-
ough analysis of their projected contribution to the overall
force structure. In view of the discussion contained in the
previous chapter, it is relevant to ask why this situation
has repeatedly occurred when an apparently comprehensive
process for conducting such analyses was in existence. This
is the question which the following discussion attempts to
answer through examination of several problems associated
with the documented process. In order to develop an under-
standing of why these problems existed, it is necessary to
place the process in historical perspective by delineating
two major policy changes which contributed to their genesis.
Prior to 1961, requirements determination had tradition-
ally been an individual service responsibility with coordina-
tion, as required, at the JCS level. When Robert S. McNamara
became SECDEF, however, this situation changed rapidly and
drastically. His approach was that:
"...either of two broad philosophies of management
could be followed by a Secretary of Defense. He
could play an essentially passive role — a judi-
cial role. In this role the Secretary would make
2 This examination represents the author's personal
opinions based on extensive interviews with cognizant DOD




the decisions required of him by law by approving
recommendations made to him. On the other hand,
the Secretary of Defense could play an active role
providing aggressive leadership — questioning,
suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives, and
stimulating progress. This active role represents
my own philosophy of management." [Ref. 8, p. 2].
In implementing this philosophy, he instituted the now
well-known PPB System and augmented it with a base of sophis-
ticated analytic support at the OSD level. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, Alain Enthoven,
quickly became one of the most powerful men in DOD. He and
his staff took on a pre-eminent role in the requirements de-
termination process and were deeply involved in the defini-
tion of major system concepts during their tenure of office.
In 1969,-Melvin Laird was appointed SECDEF with David
Packard as his Deputy. These individuals viewed with alarm
the spiraling costs and technical difficulties being experi-
enced by several of the major systems (such as the C5A) ini-
tiated under the McNamara regime, and they attributed much
of the origin of these problems to McNamara' s emphasis on
centralized analysis and control. Their solution was a new
era of participatory management in which the "aim is to im-
prove both the decision-making process and also other manage-
ment activities by placing more emphasis on people and less
emphasis on elaborate procedures" [Ref. 9, p. 113]. This
philosophy provided the rationale for DODD 5000.1, "Acquisi-
tion of Major Defense Systems", which delineates the roles
of the services and OSD in the acquisition process. It
basically states that the individual services are responsible
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for the orderly identification and development of major sys-
tem requirements subject to OSD review and approval at three
crucial decision points: program initiation, full scale de-
velopment, and production/deployment. The Navy, in turn,
amplified DODD 5000.1 with SECNAVINST 5000.1 which extends
the identification and development responsibilities down to
the individual mission sponsor and program manager level,
with the CNO and SECNAV in an intermediate review and vali-
dation role.
With the foregoing historical perspective in mind, it is
now possible to examine more clearly the problems associated
with the process described in the last chapter. Again, the
discussion is conducted in the context of the functional mod-
el divisions in ox'der to facilitate comparison with the pre-
scriptive baseline.
A. FORMULATION OF STRATEGY
The procedures involved here are the development of the
NSSM's by the NSC, the JLREID and JIEP by DIA, the JLRSS and
JSOP I by JCS, and the NSS by OPNAV. The problem is basi-
cally long-range in nature and results from the inadequate
specificity of future projections. While most of the short
and mid-range documents involved in strategy formulation
were detailed, comprehensive, and widely utilized, the long-
range ones (JLREID, JLRSS, NSS) were not. Unfortunately,
these latter documents are vital to the orderly development
of major system requirements since the normal lead times in-
volved in early conceptual efforts range from five to fifteen
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years. The long-range documents were usually so vague and
general in nature that they were almost useless in force
structure planning. The primary difficulty was the lack of
appropriate techniques for developing objective forecasts of
the future. In their absence, subjective projection of cur-
rently perceived trends was the principal tool of long-range
strategy formulation. An embarrassing and wasteful conse-
quence was the genesis of system concepts which were frequent-
ly obsolete before they were ever deployed.
B. ASSESSMENT OF FORCES
The problems involved in this function stem primarily
from those just discussed. Since the analysts performing
assessments did not have a well-defined strategy base on
which to establish their projections of either force in a
long-range environment, they normally developed their own
initial assumptions. The predictable result was that assess-
ments generally reflected the parochial positions of the
originators rather than an objective comparison of opposing
forces. This situation was compounded by the fact that Navy
assessments were performed predominantly at the mission spon-
sor level, which made it extremely difficult to compare and
relate perceived deficiencies in either a Navy-wide or DOD-
wide context. While the planning guidance injected by the
DPPG and CPPG might have at least partially ameliorated the
problem, it was too broad in scope to be effective.
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C. ANALYSIS OF DEFICIENCIES
The problems noted previously created a real "snowball
effect" at this point. Since individual sponsors were basi-
cally responsible for identifying their own deficiencies, it
was only natural that they would assume that replacements or
additions composed of similar type weapons would be required.
In fact, it is unrealistic to assume that they would ever
seriously suggest that the deficiency might be most appro-
priately corrected by some type of system not under their
purview. Also, since their primary concern was typically
the replacement of existing systems, they frequently viewed
the problem more in terms of what they could get than what
they really needed (i.e. in the absence of even moderately
clear projections of deficiencies, what is technically a-
chievable becomes much simpler to define than what is re-
quired to perform the relevant mission). Therefore, those
deficiencies which were easily definable tended to evolve
quickly into specific system requirements while those which
were more distant and/or elusive were frequently addressed
in only the most general terms. As a result, the formal
procedures for providing initial direction to early explora-
tory development efforts were often either ignored or uti-
lized only for record-keeping purposes. The rationale was
that the GOR's were too general to be useful as guidance to
the R&D community and the effort required to write them was,
therefore, disproportionate to their value.
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Thus, the established procedure for delineating long-
range needs fell into disuse by both sides of the require-
ments definition dialogue and was replaced by an informal
and substantially undocumented exchange of information be-
tween the parties concerned. While this arrangement was
quite convenient and useful at the working level, it created
difficulties for the higher level officials who were respon-
sible for coordination and control of the overall deficiency
analysis function. Within the Navy, control and coordination
were constrained by the fact that the relevant time frames
were normally beyond the horizon of PPBS-oriented analyses.
Similarly, at the OSD level, the effectiveness of both the
JRDOD and the ACP's as coordination tools was reduced by un-
availability of well-documented deficiency information. In
fact, the JRDOD became little more than a collection of un-
correlated needs perceived by each separate service. The
newly instituted ACP's, on the other hand, evolved into a
set of documents that were almost exclusively concerned with
ongoing development programs which were already past the
point where they could be re-directed or dropped without
significant sacrifices of money and/or time. Furthermore,
the lack of adequate long-range analyses at the CNO or SECDEF
levels rendered meaningful review of needs by Congress vir-
tually impossible. While some critics of DOD contend that
the results of such analyses would not have been voluntarily
provided to Congress in any event, the fact remains that they
simply were not readily available.
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In summary, the deficiency analysis portion of the re-
quirements determination process was grossly inadequate prior
to 1973. As a result of the new participatory management
policies, this function had been delegated to individual
mission sponsors. Faced with insufficient guidance, coupled
with understandably parochial perspectives, they normally
developed self-perpetuating analyses of needs. Because of
rather primitive analytic capabilities, these needs tended
to be phrased in extremely vague terms unless they could be
defined by specific system parameters. As a result, the
formally documented procedure for stating long-range needs
was supplanted by an informal working level dialogue between
the user and producer. Consequently, review and control by
higher authority was greatly hampered due to the absence of
objective and comprehensive analyses.
D. SYNTHESIS OF ALTERNATIVES
As a result of the informal dialogue established between
OPNAV sponsors and NAVMAT managers, the formal exchange of
documents outlined in the synthesis section of the last chap-
ter was often totally by-passed. The principal reason ap-
pears to be that the procedure, while quite logical and
orderly on paper, was extremely cumbersome and time-consum-
ing in practice. The documents involved were considered to
be overly detailed, partially duplicative, difficult to proc-
ess, and frequently unnecessary. As a result, they were
seldom published except for the purpose of providing an
after-the-fact summary of activities and decisions. Since
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it was consequently difficult to maintain any positive con-
trol above the working level, viable alternatives for satis-
fying a particular need could easily be disguised or eliminated
without fear of serious repercussions. DDR&E attempted to
remedy the situation through the initiation of TCP's but the
impact of this fledgling effort was minimal prior to 1973.
Also, the influence of Congress over this phase of the proc-
ess was severely hampered by the fact that the budget request
for R&D was submitted and supported in terms of fiscal appro-
priation categories rather than operational mission areas.
E. EVALUATION OF CONCEPTS
The informal dialogue between OPNAV and NAVMAT which was
described in the two previous sections generally terminated
with the agreement on a particular system approach and was
frequently documented by the almost simultaneous production
of an SOR and TDP. Even these documents, however, did not
often reach publication before the system was well into en-
gineering development due to numerous processing delays with-
in the bureaucracy.
The remainder of the evaluation activities usually pro-
ceeded in the manner described except that both the CEB and
DSARC program initiation reviews were often delayed. DCP
production difficulties were often cited as the principal
cause of delay, but there is reason to believe that politi-
cal/bureaucratic considerations played a large part in the
timing of these reviews. At any rate, delay past the appro-
priate program initiation decision point almost always had
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the effect of reducing the viable decision options available
to the review panels and, therefore, degraded the effective-
ness of their important validation role. Congress, as the
final authority in the process, was also hampered by delays.
On several occasions, development budget requests were de-
layed until the point where significant costs in time, money,
or readiness would almost surely result if the requested
funds were not promptly appropriated.
In conclusion, the major problems which were involved in
the pre-1973 formally documented process may be grouped into
three broad categories: direction and coordination; execution
and documentation; review and control.
Most of the problems associated with direction and coor-
dination can be traced, either directly or indirectly, to the
vacuum that was created when centralized analysis and control
was replaced by participatory management. When DODD 5000.1
and SECNAVINST 5000.1 moved the bulk of the analytic respon-
sibilities for requirements determination from the OSD level
to the mission sponsor level, neither DDR&E nor the CNO were
adequately prepared to supply the direction and coordination
which had previously been exercised by OASD Systems Analysis
on behalf of SECDEF. Consequently, the individual mission
sponsors were given a great deal of analytic latitude which
they tended to utilize in a predictably parochial manner.
The problems associated with execution and documentation,
on the other hand, are mostly products of two basically un-
related phenomena: the uncertainty inherent in long-range
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projections and the inflexibility inherent in standardized
procedures. While the process described in the last chapter
appears to correspond very closely with the prescriptive
baseline, the fact that it was keyed to a complex progres-
sion of many voluminous documents made it virtually unmanage-
able. Several of the documents involved suffered from
inadequate preparation and burdensome processing and, as a
result, were often by-passed in favor of informal dialogues.
While working level communication and performance were en-
hanced by this arrangement, supervisory level functions were
severely degraded.
Finally, the major problems associated with review and
control are predominantly bureaucratic or political in na-
ture. From the standpoint of the organization being evaluated
or controlled, the normal objective is to minimize outside
interference as much as possible. At each level of review,
from the CEB to the Congress, it is therefore quite natural
for the sponsoring organization to constrain the options of
the reviewer as tightly as possible to the sponsor-preferred
alternative.
Regardless of how the various problems originated, they
all resulted in a relatively inefficient process which wasted
valuable resources and degraded future military readiness.
The next chapter describes and analyzes a variety of new pro-




V. SURVEY OF RECENT PROCEDURAL CHANGES 3
The problems noted in the last chapter have prompted the
initiation of procedural revisions throughout DOD. While
many of these problems have been recognized and analyzed for
several years, it was not until publication of the Report of
the Commission on Government Procurement in 1972 that the
impetus for change really gained momentum. Consequently,
major revisions to the process have been implemented only in
the last two years even though many of them originated with
the 1970 introduction of the Laird-Packard participatory
management philosophy into DOD.
It has been noted that the major problems associated with
the formulation of military strategy resulted primarily from
the extreme generality and vagueness of the relevant long-
range planning documents. In response to these problems,
JCS and DIA initiated an in-depth study to determine what im-
provements could be made. Specifically, three well-known
research centers (i.e. Hudson Institute, Consolidated Analy-
sis Center, and the Institute for Defense Analyses) were
commissioned to develop new methodologies for production of
3 This survey is based on interviews conducted with DOD
officials as well as an examination of applicable OSD , JSC
,
and Navy documents [Refs.10, 12, 20, 21, 22, 28]. Reference
to classified material has been avoided in order to preserve
the unclassified nature of this thesis.
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the JLREID and JLRSS in order to make them more useful to
long-range planners. The orientation of the revised JLREID
is toward a strictly qualitative appraisal of trends which
are likely to affect world power relationships, with particu-
lar emphasis on associated conflict possibilities. The
JLRSS, on the other hand, is being given a more quantitative
flavor through the use of environmental forecasting techniques
based on regression analysis. While it is too early to assess
the real value of these changes, the mere fact that efforts
are underway to develop more viable and useful documents is
encouraging.
The Navy, on the other hand, has virtually abandoned its
effort to produce or update the Navy Strategic Study. In-
stead, several special-purpose strategy projections have
been developed. One of the most comprehensive of these is
Project 2000 which was recently published at the direction
of the CNO. Its purpose is to examine the trends which are
most likely to affect the shape of the Navy through the last
quarter of the twentieth century. Almost exclusively quali-
tative in nature, it is based on the projection of an envi-
ronment in which world power relationships remain approximately
as they exist today. While this study represents a valuable
and pragmatic approach to long-range planning of naval forces,
the fact that its conclusions are predicated on a single set
of assumptions limits its usefulness in a dynamic environ-
ment. Consequently, there also exists a need for a more
versatile type of forecast which reflects the sensitivity of
the naval warfare environment to changing conditions.
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B. ASSESSMENT OF FORCES
Assessment capabilities, at both the OSD and OPNAV lev-
els, have been markedly enhanced in the last few years.
Prior to 1970, DPPG guidance provided for assessments and
force planning to be accomplished under the assumption that
the U.S. would be involved in 2\ wars simultaneously (i.e.
major conflicts with both the USSR and the PRC plus a brush-
fire engagement). Since this "worst case" assumption re-
sulted in assessments which indicated an unrealistically
weak force posture, the guidance was changed to provide for
the use of a li war scenario. This was still an extremely
pessimistic assumption, however, which did not provide much
latitude for an examination of force posture trade-offs.
Consequently, the guidance was again revised in order to de-
lineate six different scenarios which are relevant for plan-
ners of general-purpose forces:
1. A full-scale war with the USSR in the NATO region.
2. A major conflict in Asia involving U.S. defense of
allies against PRC aggression.
3. Unilateral military action by the U.S., not involving
direct confrontation with the USSR or PRC.
4. A limited confrontation with the USSR outside NATO.
5. Protection of maritime security.
6. Adequate peacetime "presence" forces.
While the first three scenarios are practically the same as
those included in the 2h or l-jv war guidance, separating them
and adding the last three scenarios provides much more
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flexibility in that they can be utilized individually or in
combination, according to the needs dictated by specific
situations. Although more detailed specification will be
required in order to provide a truly uniform basis for force
planning trade-off decisions, the delineation of these six
individual scenarios is a definite step in that direction.
Another important innovation was the creation of special
panels dedicated to the task of developing assessments at
both the OSD and OPNAV levels. These groups are charged with
the responsibility for performing "a comparative analysis of
those military, technological, political, and economic fac-
tors which impede or have a potential to impede our national
security objectives, with those factors available or poten-
tially available to enhance accomplishment of these same
national security objectives" [Ref. 21]. While the OSD net
assessment organization is still in the formative stages,
its Navy counterpart has already had an impact on planning
activities. Situated within the Office of Navy Program Plan-
ning (OP-090), this group has several important functions.
Besides being the central clearing house for all Navy as-
sessment activities (e.g. the SEAMIX Study Group), it is re-
sponsible for updating the CNO Net Assessment of the United
States and Soviet Navies as well as performing other assess-
ments independently and in conjunction with OSD (e.g. The
Navy Missions Study ). As it matures, this organization
should provide the direction for Navy assessment activities
that was so sorely deficient prior to 1973.
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C. ANALYSIS OF DEFICIENCIES
Another aspect of the revised DPPG and CPPG is noteworthy
at this point. It was realized that the traditional guidance
was not adequate for long-range force planning purposes due
to its relatively short (eight-year) horizon. Consequently,
the DPPG and CPPG have been augmented by an Extended Planning
Annex (EPA) and Extended Planning Guidance (EPG) respective-
ly. These extensions lengthen the guidance horizon by ten
years in order to provide a common framework for long-range
planning throughout the Navy and DOD. In addition, the CPAM
development process was broadened to give explicit attention
to the long-range R&D issues which had previously been ex-
cluded by the eight-year planning horizon.
With tne advent of improved guidance and greater program
visibility at the CNO and SECDEF levels, the individual mis-
sion sponsors have been given a more clearly defined role in
the force planning process. Since assessments are now per-
formed on a coordinated basis and the results are promulgated
via specific planning guidance, the individual mission spon-
sors are no longer in a position to perceive deficiencies
solely on the basis of their own force projections. Hence,
their current role is mainly to analyze the CNO-perceived
deficiencies which are applicable to their areas of responsi-
bility and to determine appropriate means for correcting
them. The results of these analyses are delineated in Force
and Mission Sponsor Plans (e.g. The Surfa c e Warfare Plan )




The R&D planning system itself has been totally revised
by OPNAVINST 5000.42, "Weapon Systems Selection and Planning"
in an attempt to eliminate the numerous documentation prob-
lems described in the last chapter. While the system contin-
ues to be composed of document exchanges between OPNAV and
NAVMAT, the number of documents has been decreased and their
format has been greatly simplified and abbreviated. The ob-
jective of the revision was to retain the advantages of the
informal dialogue which had been established without sacri-
ficing the review and control attributes of a formally docu-
mented process. The initial documents in the new procedure
are the Science and Technology Objectives (STO). These re-
place the GOR's and are designed to focus early R&D efforts
on the long-range needs and problems delineated in the Force
and Mission Sponsor Plans.
At the JCS level, the joint perspective for the focus of
R&D is accomplished by the recently revised JRDOD. Dissatis-
fied with the JRDOD' s reputation as' a mere interweaving of
individual service initiatives, its originators determined to
strengthen it as a tool in support of SECDEF decision-making.
The principal thrust of the revision is the addition of pri-
orities among recommended R&D objectives plus indicators of
relative importance among ongoing R&D programs. While these
rankings primarily reflect service preferences at the pres-
ent time, they are a start toward an objective joint per-






In DDR&E, efforts are also underway to provide better
orientation of R&D through higher visibility of competing
alternatives. In response to recommendations by the DSARC
Weapons Systems Cost Reduction Working Group, the ACP's have
been augmented by a new set of documents known as Mission
Concept Papers (MCP). These papers are designed as planning
documents to provide OSD officials with an understanding of
the broad functional and fiscal context into which proposed
systems must fit during their life cycle. They are intended
to be similar to ACP's but expanded in scope to include
threat assessments, deficiency projections, and resource
availabilities. Pilot papers have already been written for
the missions of Strategic Offense, Continental Air Defense,
and Theater Air Defense. While it is not possible to accu-
rately assess their usefulness at this time, the consensus
within DOD appears to be that they are too broad in scope to
be valuable tools in the DSARC decision-making process.
Another effort at the OSD level which has apparently
achieved limited success is the reorientation of the SECDEF
and DDR&E Posture Statements to Congress. In response to
Commission on Government Procurement recommendations, these
statements have recently given more emphasis to long-range
projections in order to provide Congress with a better under-
standing of the rationale behind DOD R&D requirements.
48

D. SYNTHESIS OF ALTERNATIVES
Returning to the discussion of the revised Navy R&D plan-
ning system, the synthesis of alternative system concepts in
response to Science and Technology Objectives is now delin-
eated by NAVMAT in a new document called Navy Advanced Con-
cepts (NAC). This document is an outgrowth of the Navy
Technological Projections and replaces it in the revised
procedure. Its purpose is to outline various Advanced Sys-
tem Concepts (ASC) as an aid to OPNAV sponsors in refining
their perceptions of need.
When the sponsor is able to define the specific perform-
ance parameters needed, and these parameters are considered
by NAVMAT to be within the state-of-the-art, an Operational
Requirement (OR) can be issued. This document is similar in
purpose to its predecessors, the TSOR and SOR, but it is
performance oriented and limited to three pages in length in
order to avoid the tremendous publication problems that
plagued the previous procedure. Together, the OR's and STO's
comprise the Navy R&D Plan which is administered by the Di-
rector, RDT&E (OP-098) as the central repository of Navy R&D
planning guidance.
When an OR is promulgated by OPNAV, NAVMAT responds with
a Development Proposal (DP) as the final document in the new
R&D "user-producer" exchange. This document, the successor
to the old PTA's and TDP's, outlines the range of viable




AT the OSD level, two important refinements to the syn-
thesis portion of the requirements determination process have
recently emerged. First, the TCP's have proved to be a high-
ly useful tool for illuminating R&D capabilities and problems
on a DOD-wide basis. Second, the DDR&E Posture Statement to
Congress has effectively implemented the Commission on Gov-
ernment Procurement's recommendation concerning the delinea-
tion of ongoing R&D programs by mission area rather than
appropriation category. The statement in support of the
FY75 RDT&E budget request clearly delineated the impact of
current development programs in both a mission and appropria-
tion context.
E. EVALUATION OF CONCEPTS
This last functional division of the process has experi-
enced almost as much change in the last two years as any of
those previously discussed. Within the Navy, an Acquisition
Review Committee (ARC) has been established as a sub-panel
of the CEB to monitor CNO-designated programs which are be-
low DSARC review thresholds. All OR's which fall in this
category, as well as the more major ones, must be validated
by the CEB/ARC prior to promulgation. When an approved OR
and its corresponding DP have subsequently defined the rele-
vant system alternatives, a Navy Development Concept Paper
(NDCP) is drafted and reviewed by the CEB/ARC for the purpose
of designating the CNO-preferred alternative and authorizing
commencement of the conceptual development phase. After
conceptual efforts are completed and the program is ready to
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enter the validation phase, a DCP is drafted and submitted
to the CEB/ARC. If approved, it proceeds to the Department
of the Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council (DNSARC),
composed of SECNAV and his Assistants plus the CNO and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. This body has the responsi-
bility for providing the final pre-DSARC program validation
and establishing the Department of the Navy position on the
development alternatives. While this three-stage review
process within the Navy should markedly improve control capa-
bilities, there exists a very real danger that it may also
serve to eliminate viable alternatives before the DSARC pro-
gram initiation review is convened.
The OSD level review procedure is also being refined with
the development of D0D1 5000.2. "The DCP and Ihe DSARC."
This instruction will delineate, for the first time, exactly
what information should be contained in the DCP and what
criteria are to be used at the three DSARC program reviews.
While most of this information has been generally known and
accepted for quite some time, it has not yet been given of-
ficial recognition.
In summary, the many changes which have been instituted
in the requirements determination process during the 1973-74
time frame can be grouped into the three categories mentioned
in the last chapter: direction and coordination; execution
and documentation; review and control.
The improvements in the direction and coordination area
have been implemented primarily at the CNO and SECDEF levels.
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They consist of more thorough and extended guidance through
the DPPG and CPPG, as well as increased staff support for
the functions of comparative force assessment and mission
deficiency analysis. Execution and documentation improve-
ments, on the other hand, have occurred mostly at the work-
ing level and have involved sophistication of procedures and
simplification of documents. Finally, review and control
have been enhanced by efforts to ensure higher visibility at
intermediate stages in the process for the benefit of Con-
gress as well as CNO and SECDEF.
The revised process, as discussed in this chapter, is
summarized in figure 5. It is interesting to note that this
figure is, in most respects, very similar to figure 4 (i.e.
the pre-1973 process) notwithstanding the many changes which
have occurred. The reason for this phenomenon lies in the
fact that most of the problems delineated in the last chap-
ter were viewed within DOD as the result of inadequate pro-

















































































































y CO v W



































53 HO <M P
H 53O Js2






























A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
This analysis has traced the evolution of the require-
ments determination process for major naval weapon systems
during the 1970-74 time frame. The combination of a func-
tional model developed by this author and an organizational
model developed by the Commission on Government Procurement
was used as a prescriptive baseline for the purpose of eval-
uating actual DOD/Navy procedures. It was determined that
the procedures in effect prior to 1973 paralleled the base-
line functionally, but not organizationally, and three major
problem areas were noted. First, guidance and coordination
of the process were sorely lacking, due primarily to the
transition from the McNamara philosophy of centralized con-
trol to the Laird-Packard philosophy of participatory manage-
ment. Second, execution and documentation suffered from
both uncertainty difficulties and inflexible procedures.
Third, review and control were degraded by the inadequacy of
the analytic support available to decision-makers and by the
numerous bureaucratic constraints endemic to any large or-
ganization such as DOD.
As a consequence of the interest and visibility generated
by publication of the Report of the Commission on Government
Procurement
,
internal DOD studies of the major problem areas
began to result in extensive procedural changes by 1973. The
guidance from SECDEF and CNO was made both more comprehensive
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in scope and extended in horizon, in an effort to provide
positive direction to the process. Assessment capabilities
at both the OSD and OPNAV levels were strengthened in order
to establish a uniform basis for the analysis of specific
mission deficiencies. Extensive efforts at the working lev-
els were initiated to develop new methodologies for dealing
with uncertainty and to provide a simplified, performance-
oriented approach to "user-producer" communication and docu-
mentation. Finally, analytic tools at the CNO and OSD levels
were refined in order to improve control capabilities, and
congressional briefings were reoriented in an effort to en-
hance the legislators' understanding of DOD planning ration-
ale.
B. PROGNOSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While it is much too early to make any definitive pre-
diction concerning the real adequacy of these procedural
changes, it is possible to analyze their apparent value. By
the standard of the prescriptive baseline, the current proc-
ess appears to be complete in both a functional and an or-
ganizational context. It may be concluded, therefore, that
the new procedure can, but not necessarily will
,
correct the
major problems which plagued the pre-1973 process. The mere
existence of comprehensive and workable procedures does not
by any means guarantee that the requirements determination
process will be any better or more efficient in the future
than it was in the past. None of the diverse political and
bureaucratic forces that degraded the effectiveness of the
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previous process have been eliminated. In fact, they will
most likely become stronger as the competition for resources
within DOD becomes more intense. It is, therefore, mandatory
that direction and control of the process be further devel-
oped at both the SECDEF and CNO levels. Such action requires
that assessment and analysis capabilities continue to be
strengthened. While the Navy efforts in this area appear to
be sufficient, it is not clear that the same is true for OSD.
DDR&E has experienced very little success in its attempts to
provide SECDEF with coordinated analyses of long-range de-
fense requirements and corresponding R&D programs. Likewise,
the JCS planners have met with many difficulties in over-
coming their reputation for mere interweaving of service-
submitted initiatives. Consequently, the long-range analytic
base for decisions at the SECDEF level has been, and contin-
ues to be, undesirably weak.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analy-
sis & Evaluation (ASDPA&E) is the SECDEF 's principal reposi-
tory of analytic support. For the past several years, the
influence of this Office has been greatly diminished as a
result of the mistakes attributed to it during the McNamara-
Enthoven era. Under the current administration, it has be-
gun to regain stature and take a more active role in the
SECDEF decision-making process. If SECDEF is to receive the
scope and depth of analytic support required for effective
long-range orientation of defense programs, the role of
ASDPA&E in the analysis phase of requirements determination

process should be expanded. Like its counterpart at the CNO
level (OP-96), it should be made the focal point for all as-
sessment and analysis activities in support of both the
SECDEF guidance for long-range force planning and the DSARC
program initiation reviews. While some critics may contend
that such action would impinge on the prerogatives of DDR&E,
it is this author's conviction that technical functions are
the appropriate province of scientists and engineers, but
analysis should be performed by analysts. It is, therefore,
suggested that the development of needs-oriented documents
(e.g. ACP's and MCP's) should be a function of ASDPA&E rather
than DDR&E.
In conclusion, the requirements determination process
has been substantially altered by the changes instituted in
the last two years. The revised process appears to be in
accord with the prescriptive baseline developed in this the-
sis. If it is to succeed in practice as well as on paper,
however, it will be necessary that each of the participants
cooperate in making it work. Since the existence of fierce
competition for resources among services and mission sponsors
tends to inhibit such cooperation, objective and comprehen-
sive analyses in support of decision-making at the CNO and
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